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CASE COMMENTS
AGFucy-LmsBarr Or Ao&iT.-Appellee real estate agent, was employed by R. to sell at auction his farm. At the sale appellant, G,
became purchaser for $8,000. As per terms of the sale G. paid 10%
of the purchase price, to-wit, $800, making the check payable to the
agent, who endorsed and delivered it to R. R. paid the agent his commission in cash, but being unable to convey good title to G. the latter
sued both R. and the agent to recover the $800. R. was adjudged bankrupt before suit. G. relies on the principle of an auctioneer being
stakeholder, for recovery against the agent. Held, judgment against
R. affirmed but dismissed as to the agent; the 10% paid was not deposited as a trust fund in hands of the agent, but was part-payment or
trust fund in hands of the owner, and the agent is not liable for the
return thereof to payer. Gossage v. Waddle, et al. 18 S. W. (2nd) 975.
The general rule is that "a payment properly made to an agent for
a known principal in pursuance of a valid authority, and without fraud,
duress or mistake, may not be recovered from the agent. The remedy,
in the event the recovery of the money becomes available, is against
the principal." Robenson v. Yann, 5 S. W. (2nd) 271, 230 Ky. 148.
Aside from the general rule as stated in the above case and followed
in this case, there seems to be few cases in this state directly upon the
question involved, but we find in 2Noble v. Clark, 283 S. W. 975, 214 Ky.
569, "where a purchaser of a lot at auction made first payment to vendor, who indorsed check to auctioneer as his commission, the auctioneer
is not liable to purchaser as a stakeholder for money paid, though vendor fails to convey good title." Altho distinguishable from case under
discussion, yet by analogy this conforms to the general rule, above
stated. See also, Pool v. Adkisson, et al. 1 Dana (Ky.) 110.
However, there is abundant authority establishing this general
rule in other states as found in Allen v. Globe Grain & Mill Co., 104
Pac. 305, 156 Cal. 286, "a cash payment to agent by the purchaser, and
money paid to vendor by the agent, the vendor alone is liable for repayment upon his failure to convey."
Also, in Lang v. Friedman,148 S. W. 992, 166 Mo. App. 354; Steinberg v. W4Tisoh, 142 Atl. 824, 6 N. 3. Misc. R. 819; Cohen v. Barry, 108
N. Y. Supp. 573; Tripple v. Liftlefield, 89 Pac. 493, 46 Wash. 156.
We find one variation of the general rule in the case of Cassimus
v. Vaughn Realty Co., 117 So. 180, 217 Ala. 561, where it is held that
"where money paid to an agent which in equity belongs to the payer, is
recoverable from the agent prior to his payment thereof to the prineipal." This case can readily be distinguished from the one at bar in
that no suit was brought by the payer there before the agent had paid
the money over to the principal or owner of the land.
Only one class of cases upholds responsibility of, the agent for
return of money paid as part of purchase price where the owner has

OASE COMMENTS
failed to convey after receiving such money. This class of cases includes those situations where the principal has no right to receive the
money; where it was paid by mistake; where the agent has exceeded
his authority or was guilty of misfeasance; where payment was induced
by fraud or there was an explicit agreement to return it to the payer.
A. J. A.
APPEAL AND ERwD--RELATIoN oF MOTION FOn NEw TRTAL To APPEAL.
-Plaintiff sued for money paid on false representations of defendant.
At the conclusion of the evidence offered by the plaintiff the trial court
sustained a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant,
This was on November 18, 1927. On December 15, 1927, the plaintiff
entered a motion for a new trial setting up the sole ground of newly
This motion was overruled and he appealed.
discovered evidence.
Held, that the only ground for new trial embodied in the motion being
newly discovered evidence, no other ground can be considered on appeal.
Brown v. Union Packing Co., 229 Ky. 198, 16 S. W. (N. S.) 1024.
That this has long been the law in Kentucky will permit of but
little doubt. The first Kentucky case on the subject seems to be Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 3 Bush 480. There it is said: "The code requires all grounds relied upon for new trial to be specified in writing,
consequently no error not so stated could be noted by the circuit court
and is necessarily beyond the sphere of this court's jurisdiction, which
is only to decide whether on grounds properly before it the circuit
court erred in its judgment."
When there is no motion for a new trial nothing but the pleadings,
verdict and the judgment will be considered on appeal. Western As8urance Co. v. Rector, 85 Ky. 294,-1 S. W. 391; RhAtrwein i. Geblzart, 90
Ky. 147, 13 S. W. 447. The reason for this rule is explained in Harper
v. Harper, 73 Ky. 447. There the court holds that the judgment ap
pealed from is the overruling of the motion for a new trial and not the
judgment on the verdict. Language is used in many cases apparently
inconsistent with this view, but decisions are all in accord. It has been
said that an appeal will lie at the term at which the motion for new
trial is overruled although "the judgment appealed from" was at prior
term, Stearn Coal and Liumer Co. v. Commonwealth, 163 Ky. 837, 174
S. W. 771; and that a motion for a new trial "suspends" the judgment,
Louisville Rock and Lime Co. v. Kerr, 78 Ky. 12.
Consistent with the distinction in Harper v. Harper, supra, is the
ruling that the appellant must not only make the trial court's rulings
grounds for motion for new trial but must also obtain a ruling by the
court on the motion and entry of an order denying the same. Lyon v.
Logan County Bank, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1668, 78 S. W. 454. A further consistent decision is to the effect that there must also be an exception to
this ruling. Gordon v. Gordon, 1 J. J. Marsh. 55.
The rule of the principal case does not apply to equity actions.
NVickels v. Collins, 153 Ky. 219, 154 S. W. 1090; Salyer v. Arnett, 23 Ky.
L. Rep. 321.
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There is a decided conflict of authorities upon this point in other
jurisdictions but the greater number of states are in accord. States
holding that objections to errors occurring at trial must be embodied
in motion for new trial in order to be considered on appeal are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming and Montana. States holding contra
are California, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio,
South Dakota, Washington and Oregon. Elliott on Appellate Proce.
dure, section 347, favors the majority rule for two reasons, it gives the
trial court opportunity to review its own rulings and secures uniformity.
Much can be said in support of the logic of the position taken by
the Texas courts on this subject. There it is held necessary to make
grounds for motion for new trial only such objections as the trial court
has had no previous opportunity to rule upon. As to other objections
it Is said, "The trial judge having once acted, It is not to be presumed
that he will change his ruling and hence in order to appeal from such
action it is not necessary that it be made grodnd for new triaL" Olark
v. Pearce,80 Tex. 146, 15 S. W. 787. Agreeing with this argument is 4
Texas Law Review 486.
R. M. 0.

CoRPORATios-AoPTIoaN nY CoRponAmo- OF PnomoTE's CoNmTaCTs
-Defendant Company's agent G induced S to buy machinery for the
manufacturing of duntile for the benefit of a corporation which S and
others contemplated organizing. G agreed to have the machinery installed by an expert satisfactorily. After the installation the plaintiff
corporation was formed. The machinery did not work satisfactorily
and the plaintiff sues on the agreement between G and S. Held: The
plaintiff could recover on the agreement as it had been adopted and
had been made for its benefit. Buiders Duntile Co. v. TV. G. Dunn
Mfg. Co., 17 (2d) S. W. 715.
The doctrine of the instant case rests upon the rule stated in 1
Thompson on Corporations 113 to the effect that "the power to adopt
is conceded, and the effect of the adoption Is said to be to make the
contract that of the corporation. Such a power is limited, however, to
contracts which the corporation itself could make." This is a reasonable and practical rule. The adoption theory was first applied in Kentucky in 1828 in the case of Fracfortand Shelbyville Turn ke (C. v.
ClwrlilZ, 6 T. B. Mon. 427, 17 Am. Dec. 159. It was mentioned there
that to allow the corporation to escape liability on a contract for its
benefit "would be transcendent and would verify the complaint of long
standing, and reiterated by wisdom and experience in many preceding
generations, that it is difficult to obtain common justice in a dispute
with a corporation." This view works in favor of the corporation as
well as against it.
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The English courts deny the corporation the power to ratify or
adopt a contract made by a promoter before the corporate existence for
its benefit. A corporation cannot ratify because an agency relationship
is an absolutely essential element of ratification. Such is not possible
between a promoter and a non-existent corporation. Adoption is impossible also in England because of the privity of contract theory.
Privity exists between the original parties and the later corporation
cannot become privy to a contract for its benefit merely by adoption.
Such are the views set forth in North Hydney Invest. & Tramway Co. v.
Higgins, (1899) A. C. 263; Bagot Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Clipper Pneumatic Tyre Co., (1902) 1 Oh. 146; Re English and Colonial Produce fo.,
(1906) 2 Ch. 435. Technically and theoretically the English court is
correct. Practically the English doctrine is incorrect and illogical.
Only one State, Massachusetts, follows the above view.
The great majority of American Jurisdictions allow the corporation
to ratify or adopt contracts made by promoters for its benefit, using
the terms interchangeably. This view is also open to criticism. There
is a clear cut difference in the meanings of the two words. "Adoption
is assent to a contract which was made in contemplation of the later
corporation accepting it; whereas, ratification is the adoption of an act
of one who purports to act as an agent." Ballantine on Corporations,
pages 156-166. The writer submits that in cases such as the one under
discussion that adoption is the only correct terminology. However, in
some cases the lone term ratification is used. Bloom v. Home 14.
Agency, 91 Ark. 367, 121 S. W. 293; Davis Bros. v. Montgomery Furnace
and Chemical Co., 101 Ala. 127, 8 S. W. 496.
Adoption can be either express or implied. Bruner v. Brown, 139
Ind. 600, 38 N. E. 318; In re Ballou 215 F. 810; Burden v. Burden, 40
N. Y. S. 499; Whitney v. Wyman, 101 U. S. 392. Mere acceptance of
benefits by the corporation will not make it liable. The intention of
the parties at the time -the contract was made must be ascertained.
Tryber v. Girary Creamery a7id Cold Storage Co., 67 Kai. 489, 73 P. 83.
There are three cases which should be noted before terminating
this comment. (1) Queen City Furnitureand Carpet Co. v. Crawford,
127 Mo. 356, 30 S. W. 163. The court in this case repudiated both ratification and adoption and held that what the corporation really did was
to make the original contract itself. To speak of adoption seems more
reasonable. (2) Hircup v. Anaconda Amusement Co., 59 Mont. 469,
197 P. 1005. The original contract was considered as a continuing
Krioffer; the acceptance of which made the corporation liable. (3)
delbaug v. Aldrehn Theatres Co., 195 Ia. 147, 191 N. W. 803. The court
treated the adoption by the corporation as a novation and consequently
achieved the result for which it sought.
In conclusion the writer submits that the Kentucky court is to be
W. C. W.
commended for the Proper solution of the question at bar.
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CORPORATIONS-RIGHT TO PAY AGENT Su'mf n ExcEss or CoNTAar
STnuPALoN.-According to the contract existing between the parties
the agent was to receive a certain per cent bonus on all insurance written by him provided such policies aggregated a certain amount. The
agent failed to sell sufficient insurance to entitle him to the bonus.
However, the insurance company as an inducement to keep the
agent in their employ did allow him the per cent bonus on all insurance actually written by him. Held, that the insurance company
could not recover back the amount of the bonus. American National
Assurance Co. of St. Louis v. Ricketts, 19 S. W. (2nd) 1071.
In handing down the decision in the instant case the Kentucky
Court said: "The officers of a corporation have a discretion in settling
with their agents on such terms as they think the interest of the corporation requires." There is no implied authority in a corporation
to give away any portion of the corporate property unless such gift will
result in a direct and substantial benefit to the company. 1 Morawetz,
Private Corp., 2nd Ed., 399. A business corporation is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The discretion
of the directors may be exercised in the choice of means in obtaining
the most profit. Their power does not extend to the reduction of profits
or the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote
such profits to other purposes. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459,
170 N. W. 668, 3 A. L. R. 413 (1919).
In Steinway v. Steinway, 17 Misc. Rep. 43, 40 N. Y. Supp. 718, the
court laid down the following rule: "If the act is one which is lawful
in itself, and not otherwise prohibited, is done for the purpose of serving corporate ends, in a substantial and not in a remote and fanciful
sense, it may fairly be considered within charter powers." So in regard
to gifts the real test seems to be whether or not the corporation will
receive a direct and proximate benefit therefrom. Rvans v. Brunner,
Mond & Co., 90 L. J. Ch. D. 294. Gifts which would tend indirectly to
increase profits are held ultra vires. Tomrpkinson v. Southeastern B.
Co., 1887 L. R. 37 Oh. D. 675; Davis v. Old Colony R. Co., 131 Mass. 258,
41 Am. Rep. 221; Military Ass'n v. Savannah By. Co., 105 Ga. 420, 31
S. E. 200.
Gifts to agents or employees, either directly or indirectly, are generally presumed to result in a direct and substantial benefit to the corporation. Arnstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrun Co. (D. C.), 285 Fed.
59. "It is settled," states Machen on Corporations, Vol. 1, sec. 87, "that
a corporation may bestow reasonable gratuities on its employees in addition to the compensation to which they may be legally entitled." This
is the rule generally adhered to in most jurisdictions. Maine v. Chcago Ry., 109 Iowa, 260, 70 N. W. 630; People ex rel., Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 App. Div. 150, 120 N. Y. Supp. 649; Hampson
v. Prices Patent Candle Co., 45 L. J. Ch. 437; Henderson v. Bank of
Australasia,40 Ch. D. 170; Vandall v. South San FranciscoDock Co., 40
Cal. 83; Taunton v. Royal Insurance Co., 71 English Rep. 413, 2 H. & 31L
135.
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It is submitted that the rule of the instant case, while sound in its
present application, should not be extended since it might result in the
stockholders of the corporation being deprived of profits to which they
E. E. A.
should be legally entitled.

CoRPoRATIoNs-TRANsFRn OF SToCK.-Defendant was owner of large
block of stock in an oil and gas corporation. The stock was of little
actual value but with the continuance of operation of the company
might become very valuable. For very good reasons defendant feared
an attack might be made on his life. Realizing that upon his death
the stock would have to be sold he had it assigned and transferred on
the books of the company to his son, Jno. G. White, Jr. The latter
did not know of the transaction until some time afterwards. Defendant retained possession of the certificates. The court found that defendant, in making the transfer, did not intend to relinquish control
over or divest himself of the ownership of the stock. A short time later
John G. White, Jr., was killed. He left a will leaving everything to his
brother, the plaintiff, who claims the stock by virtue of the will. Held
-Since the certificates had not been delivered title had not passed.
'White v. 'White, 229 Ky. 666, 17 S. W. (2nd) 733.
Since there is no evidence of consideration for the transfer to the
testator, the question resolves itself into this: does a transfer of shares
of stock on the books of the company by the donor without a delivery
of the certificates to the donee and where it is shown there was no
intent to relinquish control over them, give legal title?
In the case of Foxworthy v. Adams et a., 136 Ky. 403, 124 S. W.
381, Ann. Cas. 1912A 327, it was stated "the rule is that to constitute a
valid 'gift inter vivos' there must be a gratuitous and absolute transfer
of the property from the donor to the donee, taking effect immediately,
and fully executed by a delivery of the property by the donor and acceptance theerof by the donee." And again in Stark v. Kelly, 132 Ky.
376, 113 S. W. 498, the rule is thus stated, "To constitute a gift inter
vivos, the property must be delivered absolutely, and the gift must go
into Immediate effect, and where future control remains in the donor
until his death, there is no valid gift inter vivos." Such language is expressive of the general rule throughout the United States. Pow v,
Shanley, 94 Conn. 350, 109 At. 249; Hayes v. MoKinney, 73 Ind. App.
105, 126 N. E. 497; Schwab v. Schwab, 163 N. Y. S. 246, 177 App. Div.
246; In re Cooper's Estate, 263 Pa. 37, 106 Atl. 98.
In the case of Kelley-Koett MIfg. Co. et al. v. Goldenburg, 207 Ky.
695, 270 S. W. 15, cited in the case at bar, the plaintiff claimed she was
entitled to a share of stock in the defendant corporation by virtue of a
vote of the board of directors, the minutes of the meeting at which such
vote was made, and the fact that such certificate had been filled out in
her favor but remained in the stock book. Her petition was denied, the
court reiterating the essentiality of delivery.
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The decision of the Missouri case of Jones v. Jones, 201 S. W. 557.
(1918) is directly In point with the case at bar. There it was held
that it is not a sufficient delivery of stock for a party merely to have
the stock transferred to the name of the donee, but in addition to this
an actual or constructive delivery of the stock must be shown. See
also Gray v. Doubin, 188 Mo. App. 667, 176 S. W. 514.
By the weight of authority, a valid gift of stock, either inter vivos
or causa mortis, may be made by delivery of the certificate of stock
accompanied by words of absolute or present gift, without any written
assignment or indorsement or express power of attorney thereon or accompanying it. Ballantine, Private Corporations, Sect. 146, page 455;
Commonwealth v. Compton, 137 Pa. St. 138, 20 At. 417; Grymes v. Hone,
49 N. Y. 17, 10 Am. St. Rep. 313. See also Mechem, Gifts of Corporation
Shares, 20 IlI. L. Rev. 9, 30 Yale L. . 767.
Under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, which has been adopted in
seventeen states, delivery of the certificate is essential ,to transfer legal
title. This Act, which has not as yet been adopted by Kentucky, is as
follows:
Sect. 1. "Title to a certificate and to the shares represented
thereby can be transferred only (a) by delivery of the certificate indorsed either in blank or to a specified person by the person appearing
by the certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby or
(b) by delivery of the certificate and a separate document containing a
written assignment of the certificate or a power of attorney to sell, assign, or transfer the same or the shares represented thereby, signed by
the person appearing by the certificate to be the owner of the shares represented thereby. Such assignment or power of attorney may be
either in blank or to a specified person." See Ballantine, Private Corporations, section 146, p. 456.
C. E. B.

EvDNcE.NEcEssrrv o' AvowA--On appeal it was urged that the
trial court had erred in excluding competent evidence offered by appellant. In the trial the witness for the commonwealth testified to the
reputation of the prosecuting witness. On cross-examination he was
asked several questions to each of which the objection of the commonwealth was sustained. Held: Such evidence was competent and its
exclusion was erroneous, but no avowal being made as to what the witness would have said if permitted to answer that ground for error could
not be sustained. Hall v. Commonwealth, 17 S. W. (2nd) 751.
The courts of this state follow the doctrine of the principal case.
Mutic v Cormmonwealth, 186 Ky. 45, 216 S. W. 116; Mullins v. Gormvonwealth, 172 Ky. 92, 188 S. W. 1079; Martin v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky.
540, 199 S. W. 603; Gregory v. Commonwealth, 173 Ky. 188, 218 S. W.
999.
That the trial court should be apprised of the evidence sought to
be elicted from the witness if Its exclusion is to be urged as error is a
well settled general rule. 0ampbell v. State, 24 Ga. App. 138, 100 N. 17
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30; State v. Wa~lace, 110 Kan. 565, 204 P. 533; Frances v. State, 22Okla. Cr. 287, 211 P. 433; Sarkisia v. U. S., 3 Fed. (2nd) 161; People v.
Reift, 194 Cal. 640, 229 P. 947. The trial court will not be put In error
for refusing to allow the question answered when counsel did not
state to the court what answer he expected. Castona v. State, 17 Ala.
App. 421, 84 So. 871.
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. One such exception is where the question itself or the circumstances surrounding or
leading up to it show its materiality or relevancy. Evidence should be
admitted if competent and relevant upon any issue or phase of the
case. Moffatt v. U. S., 232 Fed. 561. The party offering the evidence
need not explain the point or matter to which it is addressed unless
required to do so by the court. Moor v. U. S., 150 U. S. 57. The trial
court cannot be put in error for refusing to allow the question to be
answered when it it not suggested to the court what was to be proved,
unless, the question in itself gave such information. Woods v. State,
18 Ala. App. 123, 90 So. 52; Terry v. State, 203 Ala. 99, 82 So. 113, 1
Michie's Dig. 353, 205; People v. Langzene, 307 Ill. 56, 138 N. E. 222;
State v. Finley, 211 P. 303. Where the question propounded to the witness calls for evidence prima facie relevant and legal the refusal to
allow it is error altbough no answer or proposed answer of the witness
was stated. Wheat v. State, 18 Ala. App. 554, 93 So. 209; Phoenio Ins.
0o. v. Hogg, 78 Ala. 248, 56 Am. Rep. 31; In State v. Martino, 27 N. M. 1,
192 P. 507 the court says, "It is to be noted that the question requires
no explanation to the court; it being self-explanatory. No answer the
witness could make to the question would be irrelevant or immaterial
and the rule requiring explanation to the court does not apply."
While this exception Is perhaps not universally recognized, the
Kentucky courts evidently not considering it, Hall v. Commonwealth,
8upra, yet it seems a very reasonable exception or limitation on the
general rule. It should however be applied with extreme caution. Unless the question itself or circumstances preceding or surrounding it
show clearly that the answer would have been relevant and material
to the issue the exception should not be allowed.
The reasons given for the exception to the general rule are that it
might be very inconvenient in practice if a party were required to
accompany each question with a statement of facts expected to be established regardless of whether the question was proper in form and manifestly relevant to the issue or not. It would be a means of instructing
the witness of the answer desired. For these reasons and to insure
against delay and 'carelessness in the trial court and to make it more
closely observe procedure and weigh matters carefully the exception to
the general rule should be applied.
That the general rule does not apply to cross-examination Is recognized by some courts. Cunningham v. Austin & N. W. By. Co., 88 Tex.
534, 31 S. W. 629; Harness v. State, 57 Ind. 1; Hutts v. Hutts, 62 Ind.
225. The reasons given are that the counsel Is not supposed to be
familiar with the adversary's knowledge of the case, and that to exact
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such a statement would be to require counsel either to speculate upon
the answer of the adverse witness or deal unfairly with the court.
O'Donnel v. Begar, 25 Mich. 367, 1 Thomp. Trials, Sec. 680. To be compelled to state what one expects to show by cross-examination of the
adversary's witness would often defeat the purpose by putting the witness on his guard, besides the examiner does not always know what he
may reasonably expect to bring out in the cross-examination of a witness. Knapp v. Wing, 72 Ver. 334, 47 Atl. 1075.
The Kentucky court did not recognize any distinction between
cross-examination and direct examination in the principal case. However, for the reasons given and others a distinction should be made.
K. F.

EVIDENCE-STATEWMmT OF VIMC3, IMNEDIATELY AFEn AUTOIOBILE
COLLISION, AS TO BACK HURTING, MIGHT BE CousiDEEED PART OF THE lIrS
GEsTAE.-Plaintiff was injured in a collision between auto in which she
was riding and defendant's bus. Immediately after the accident, she
said, "My back hurts so bad I can hardly stand up." The admission of
this statement as evidence was held not grounds for reversal, because
(among other reasons), it might properly be considered as a part of the
res gestae. Consolidated Coach Corporation v. Saunders, 17 S. W.
(2nd) 233, 229 Ky. 284.
No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae. The question in each case must be
decided on the particular facts and circumstances presentel. Louisville Ry. Co. v. ,Iohnson's Admr., 115 S. W. 207, 131 Ky. 277. That the
ruling of the court in Consolidated C. C. v. Saunders was correct is
amply supported by judicial decision. In Louisvfle & XV. R. Co. v.
Miller, 157 S. W. 8, 154 Ky. 236, exclamations of pain and statements
made two or three minutes after an accident by the person injured
while lying on the ground at the place of the accident were held admissible as res gestae. Such evidence meets the tests laid down in Norton's Adm'r v. Winstead, 291 S. W. 723, 218 Ky. 488, holding that statements, to be admissible as part of the res gestae, must be spontaneous
utterances of thoughts springing out of the happening itself, being made
at a time which would exclude presumption that they were the result
of premeditation or design.
In admitting the statement of the accident victim that "My back
hurts so bad I can hardly stand up," the Kentucky court was in accord
with most, if not all, of the other state and federal courts. In Kansas
City Southern Ry. Co. v. Clinton, 224 Fed. 896, Nicoll v. Sweet, 144 N.
W. 615, 163 Ia. 683, Sutton v. Southern Ry. Co., 64 S. E. 401, 82 S. 0. 345,
Alabanka Power Co. v. Edwards, 121 So. 543, Runnells v. Pecos & X. T.
Ry. Co., 107 S. W. 647, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 150, and Pryorv. Payne, 263 S.
W. 972, 304 Mo. 560, the question of the admissibility of statements of
an injured party, made immediately after the accident, was presented
for adjudication. The main facts in each case were very similar to
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those in Saunders case. And in each case the court held the evidence
admissible as a part of the res gestae. These cases are in accord with
the general rule stated in Bacan v. CarZton, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 586, (approved in L. & N. R. Co. v. Smith, 84 S. W. 755, 27 K. L. R. 257, and in
L. & X. R. Co. v. Scalf, 159 S. W. 804, 155 Ky. 273, "Where the bodily
or mental feelings of a party are to be proved, the usual and natural
expressions of such feelings made at the time, are considered competent
as original evidence in his favor."
R. L.

Gnrs-GuT CAUsA MonTi.-Defendant was sued for postal savings
certificates by donor's administrator. Donor, on being taken to the
hospital, gave his nephew the certificate wrapped in a packet. After
being in the hospital about ten days the donor expressed his belief that
he could only live a short time and told his nephew to give the certificates to the defendant, which the nephew did. Held, since from the
evidence ii appeared that: (1) the testator was competent, (2) the gift
was made in view of the donor's death impending from an existing disorder, (3) the donor died within a few days from the cause then expected, (4) there was a clear intention to make a present gift and (5)
there was execution of this intention by delivery to a third person for
the donee, all the requisites of a gift causa mortis were present and
the gift must stand. Williams v. Letton, 228 Ky. 371, 15 S. W. (N. S.)
296.
The dtoctrine of gifts causa mortis is a very ancient one, coming, as
Blackstone suggests, from the Greeks to the Roman law under Justinian. The doctrine was first recognized in England in 1717 in the case
of Drury v. Smith, 1 P. Wins. 404, 24 Eng. Rep. 446. By reason of its
antiquity and universal application the law of gifts causa mortis is
fairly well settled and the requisites to the validity of such gift rather
certain.
The first requisite, as laid down in the instant case, that is, the
competency of the donor, consists of two elements; the donor must be
sui juris and of sufficient mental capacity. Royston v. McCulley, 50 S.
W. 725, 52 L. R. A. 899. The same rules govern the requirements for
mental capacity as in the case of making a will. Hass v. M Cormack,
62 Minn. 234, 64 N. W. 385; Matter of Hall, 16 Misc. (N. Y.) 174,
38 N. Y. Supp. 1135; Gardner on Wills, p. 10.
It is universally held that the gift must be made in view of the
donor's death in the near future from an existing disorder. See 1
Story Eq. Jur. 607a. Blackstone speaks of the donor as "apprehending
his dissolution near." 2 Blackstone Commentaries 514. This view is
found expressed in Kentucky in Knott v. Hogan, 4 Metcalf 99, and
Walden v. Dixon, 5 T. B. Mdonroe 170. According to Bigelow, one of
the leading cases in other jurisdictions is Ridden v. Thral, 125 N" Y.
572, 26 N. E. 627. It is also unmistakably requisite in England. Edwards v. Jones, 5 L. J. Ch. 194, 40 Eng. Rep. 361.
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The validity of the gift "is dependent upon the condition of death
occurring substantially as expected by the donor." 3 Redfield on Wills,
322. This is properly interpreted by Earl, J. in Ridden v. Thrall, supra;
"The doctrine meant to be laid down was that the donor must not recover from the disease from which he apprehended death." This s the
accepted meaning of the courts' third requirement. Peck v. Scofield,
186 Mass. 108, 71 N. E. 109.
That there must be a clear intention to make a present gift has
clearly been the law in Kentucky, Duncan v. Duncan, 5 Litt. 12; Roche
v. George, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 493; as well as in other jurisdictions, In re
Tart, 180 N. 0. 105, 104 S. E. 65; Gano v. Fiske, 43 Ohio St. 462; 30 N.
E. 532. "Courts will require in every case clear and convincing proof,
yet when it is once ascertained that it Is the intention of the donor to
make such a gift . . . the gift will be sustained." Scott v. Union
- Planters Bank, 123 Tenn. 258, 130 S. W. 757. See also discussion in
Parkerv. Copeland, 76 N. J. Eq. 685, 64 A. 129.
Under the civil law delivery was not absolutely essential. Kenistons v. Sceva, 54 N. H. 24. Under the common law however delivery is
necessary to validity. Webber v. Salisbury, 149 Ky. 327, 148 S. W. 34;
Butler v. Ecoferd, 4 J. 3. Marsh. 139, 20 Am. Dec. 211. That this delivery might be made to a third person for the donee does not appear
to be questioned. In England it was never denied. Bouts v. Ellis, 17
Beav. 121, 51 Eng. Rep. 978. In the first case of gift causa mortis in
England, Drury v. Smith, supra, delivery was to a third person. This
view has been consistently followed in the United States. Devol v.
Dye, 123 Ind. 321, 24 N. E. 246.
Postal savings certificates follow the same rules as govern choses
in action in general in' that they are properly subject to such gift.
Stephenson v. King, 81 Ky. 425, 80 Am. Rep. 173; Sessions v. Mosely,
4 Cush (Mass.) 87; Veal v. Veal, 27 Beav. 303, 54 Eng. Rep. 118.
R. M. 0.
JUDES-RiGHT TO QUESTION FACTS STATED IN AFIAV= TO HVn
JUDGE VACATE BENao.-After a decree of divorce, alimony and the cus-

tody of their child, the appellee gave notice he would move the court
to reinstate the case and modify the judgment. A motion was filed in
Court by the appellant which was supported by affidavit, asking that
and giving reasons why the regular judge should vacate the bench. In
overruling the latter motion the judge gave as his reason that the statements in the affidavit were untrue. Held-When facts are stated in an
affidavit for purpose of having the regular judge vacate the bench, they
cannot be put in Issue or called in question by the judge. Jasper v.
Jasper,229 Ky. 137, 16 S. W. (2nd) 787.
Section 968, Kentucky Statutes, provides, " . . . or, if either
party shall file with the clerk of the court his affidavit that the judge
will not afford him a fair and Impartial trial . . . the parties, by
agreement, may elect one of the attorneys of the court to preside on the
trial . . . or hold the court for the occasion."

CASE COMENTS
A. thorough review of the above statute was made in the case of
Powers v. Commonwealth, 114 Ky. 237, 70 S. W. 644, 1050, 71 S. W. 494.
In speaking of the statute the court said: "From this statute and the
decisions quoted from, the law may be gathered to be, if a litigant files
his affidavit, stating that the judge will not give him a fair and impartial trial, and states therein the basis of such belief, or if the facts so
stated are such 'as would prevent an official of personal integrity from
presiding in the case or as would prevent him from affording a fair
and impartial trial' then the truth of the statement of the facts as set
out in the affidavit must be assumed, for it cannot be traversed or tried."
The basis of such a statute is the well recognized cardinal rule of
law that every person charged with the commission of a crime or misdemeanor or who prosecutes or defends in a civil action, is entitled to
a fair and impartial trial of the case on its merits. This rule is declared in some form in nearly all of the constitutions of the states of
the Union. In Kentucky it is expressed in sections 7, 11, 14 of the Bill
of Rights, the provisions for its enforcement being, in part, contained
in section 968 of the Statutes, supra. Stamp v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky.
404, 243 S. W. 27.
To entitle a litigant to have the regular judge retire he must state
in his affidavit the facts upon which he founds his belief that the judge
will not give him a fair trial; and the facts thus stated must be such
as should prevent the judge from presiding. The trial judge determines the sufficiency of the affidavit and his decision is subject to revision on appeal. German Ins. Co. v. Landrum, 38 Ky. 433, 11 S. W. 367;
.Sparks v. Colston, 109 Ky. 711,, 60 S. W. 540; Schmidt v. Mitchell, 101
Ky. 570, 41 S. W. 929.
The objection to the trial judge, to be available, must be made before an appearance to the merits of the action, or the submission 'of preliminary motions by either party preparatory to a trial German Ins.
Go. v. Landrum, supra.
In accord with the decision in the case at bar is the case of Berger
v. U. S., 255 U. S. 22, 65 L. Ed. 481. It was there held that under Jud.
Code sect. 21 (Comp. St. sect. 988) which is similar to our own statute,
that the judge against whom the affidavit is filed, cannot pass on the
truth of the matters alleged or preside on the trial. He may, however,
pass on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit.
The reasons for the rule of law in the case at bar would seem to
be based on the principle that the dignity of the court shall be preserved; that the judge shall not be called upon to lose his identity as a
representative of the sovereignty of the state in that of a litigant in
his own court, which would be the inevitable result were he called upon
to affirm or deny the statements in an affidavit made foi the purpose
of having him vacate the bench.
C. E. B.
Mns AND lniAxs-RiGF
or GAs WEmr Ow-mm To REDucE
NEioG0ou's Ftow.-Appellant operated two gas wells upon the C. lease
near town of C. Appellee bought a small tract of land near the C.
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lease and drilled for and procured natural gas. Under franchise from
town of C. appellee entered into active competition with appellant in
supplying natural gas to residents of the town. Appellant installed on
0. lease a compressor which can be operated so as to increase pressure
in service mains and flow from wells to which it is coupled. Appellant
insists such use of compressor is solely to maintain proper pressure.
Appellee contends such use of compressor has materially reduced flow
in its wells and is for purpose to destroy competition of appellee.
Held, judgment allowing injunction reversed. "An owner of a gas well
may increase the flow of natural gas therefrom for a legitimate purpose
by the use of a pump or compressor, notwithstanding flow of wells in
adjoining land be thereby diminished." United Carbon Co. v. Campbellsville Gas Co., 18 S. W. (2nd) 1110.
As to the question whether the owner of a gas well may increase
the flow for a legitimate purpose the law seems to be well settled as
is seen in Calor Oil and Gas Co. v. Franzell, 128 Ky. 715, 109 S. W. 328
"All parties owning gas wells in the district are free to make any legitimate use of gas they choose, and the fact that this legitimate use tends
to exhaust the supply gives the other owners of gas wells in the district
no ground of complaint." Also in, Lo'isviZle Gas Co. v. Ky. Heating
Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S. W. 368, "every owner may bore for gas on his own
ground, and may make a reasonable use of it; but he may not wantonly
injure or destroy the reservoir common to him and his neighbor."
The question as to use of pump or compressor in increasing the gas
flow and consequent reduction of neighbor's flow has not heretofore
been raised or decided in this state, but by analogy with decisions upon
the same question as to oil, the holding of the court in the case at bar
is well supported by the able opinion of Dietzman, J., and its soundness
cannot be questioned.
Thus in Jones v. Forrest Oil Co., 194 Pa. 379, 48 L. R. A. 748, holding, "a gas pump may lawfully be used to increase the production of
wells, altho the production of wells on adjoining property is thereby
diminished;" also, Natlie Oil Co. v. La. Ry. Co., 137 La. 706, 69 So. 146,
"the owner of a well has the right to explode nitroglycerine or other
explosives in a well to increase the flow of gas or oil, even though he
thereby may, or actually does, draw away the gas or oil in the adjoining territory."
Indiana seems to be the only jurisdiction which is not willing textend the rule as to use of pump or compressor to gas wells in obtaining an increase in flow. There, by statute such means are expressly
prohibited, yet this statutory prohibition fails to provide for the question as presented in the case at bar where the increased flow was not
primarily to obtain larger quantity of gas, but to increase the pressure
to enable the appellant to furnish distant towns with the use thereof.
As to oil wells it is the settled practice, fortified by judicial decisions, that the owner has the right to pump them, and oil and gas being
analogous by decisions in this regard, the owner of a gas well, at least
for a legitimate purpose, has the like right.
A. . A.

CASE COMMENTS
or EXPEaT
AND SURGEOiS-MALPhAcTICE--NECESS1TY
Pnrsio.s
TsTDoN.-Action against a dentist for malpractice in fracturing a
Jaw-bone while remvving an impacted wisdom tooth. Held: That in
an action against a physician for damages for want of proper skill
plaintiff has the burden of showing such want, and such want of skill
and care can only be established by experts skilled in that profession.
Donoho v. Rawleigh, 18 S. W. (2nd) 311.,
The principal case follows the general rule as to the necessity of
expert testimony required in a malpractice case. Miller v. Toles, 183
Mich. 252, '15 N. W. 118; Lorenz v. Terche, 157 Minn. 437, 196 N. W.
564; Ladz v. Warta, 111 Neb. 521, 196 N. W. 901. Upon questions in
volving a highly specialized art the court and the jury must be dependent on expert evidence and when there is no such evidence to support an allegation depending on such a question there is nothing to
justify submitting the issue to the jury. Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442.
In order to win an action of damages for malpractice it must be
shown that the physician was negligent in failing to exercise such skill
and care as his employment requires. Norkett v. Martin, 63 Colo. 220,
165 P. 256. That degree of care and skill necessary is that which physicians in the same school usually exercise in the- same or similar
localities under the same or similar circumstances. Kuchnemann v.
Boyd, 193 Wis. 588, 214 N. W. 326. The standard of ordinary skill and
care must be established by testimony of experts. McGraw v. Kcer, 23
Colo. App. 163, 128 P. 870; Hunter v. BurrougMs, 123 Va. 113, 96 S. E.
360. Without such testimony the jury has no standard to determine
whether the defendant was negligent. Kuchnemann v. Boyd, supra.
It is improper to submit malpractice case to the jury without expert
testimony to establish the standard according to which they are to
Inference without such proof
judge the conduct of the defendant.
would be merely a matter of speculation. Gallagher v. Kermott, 56 N.
D. 176, 216 N. W. 569. Bad results and a showing of the circumstances
do not justify an inference of improper treatment. Evidence of experts that negligence or unskillfulness in their opinion caused the bad
results and suffering is necessary. Miller v. Toles, supra.
Expert testimony is not necessary in every case to establish negligence of the physician. A distinction is drawn between cases involving
the merits of a diagnosis and scientific treatment and cases where during the performance of the operation and treatment an ulterior act or
omission occurs which does not require scientific opinion to throw light
on the subject. Werzeldt v. Hartzell, 1 Fed. (2nd) 633. In the first
class of cases expert testimony is necessary to establish negligence. In
the second type of cases it is not. Whether an operation is skillfully or
unskillfully performed is a scientific question to be established by the
testimony of experts. If, however, the surgeon should loose his instrument in the incision it would seem as a matter of common sense that
scientific opinion could throw no light on the subject of negligence.
Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 P. 235. The jury is not necessarily bound by expert testimony but can take into consideration the
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proved facts and circumstances attending the operation. Reynolds v.
Smith, 148 Iowa 264. Ordinarily jurors would find difficulty without
the help of medical evidence in determining the right of a patient to
recover against his physician for malpractice, based on the lack of
scientific skill, but the result may be of such a character as to warrant
an inference of want of care from the testimony of laymen or in the
light and knowledge of the juries themselves. Benson v. Bean, 232 N.
Y. 52, 133 N. E. 125; Whitson v. HiZlis, (N. D.) 215 N. W. 480; Leighton
v. Sargent, 31 N. H. 119, 64 Am. Dec. 323.
K. F.

PLEADING-WHERE PARTY WiTnDR&ws DERnER AYTER CouRT's
ACTioN. iN I1R0OPERLY OVERRULIG ir, RECORD MUST BE TREATED AS
THOUGH No DEMURRER HAD EvER BEE Fn.ED.-Plaintiff's petition, in an
action for death of automobile occupant in Illinois, failed to state that
deceased had a widow or next of kin surviving him, as was required by
statutes of Illinois. Court improperly -overruled defendant's demurrer,
and he withdrew it. Defendant's motion for a peremptory instruction
at the close of plaintiff's testimony was granted. In affirming the case,
the Court of Appeals treated the record as though no demurrer had
ever been filed. Utterback'sAdmr. v. Quick, 230 Ky. 333, 19 S. W. (2d)
980.
This particular question seems well settled in Kentucky. Trigg v.
Shields, 3 Ky. 176; Strecdon v. Bayless, 5 Ky. 60; Farrow v. Turner,
9 Ky. 495. A waiver of the demurrer by pleading over will be a virtual
withdrawal and its effect on the record will be the same, i. e., the record
will be treated as though no demurrer had ever been filed, and the decision of the court in overruling the demurrer cannot be assigned as
error. Crozier v. Gano, 4 Ky. 257; Beiler v. Young, 6 Ky. 520; Fehleiv. Gosnell, 99 Ky. 380; Dickson v. Gleason, Id.
That a- withdrawn demurrer forms no part of the record seems so
well settled that courts treat the result as a matter of course; and
when they find it necessary to comment thereon, they generally confine
their comments to short statements of the rule, and citation of authority for the rule is deemed superfluous. Fehler v. Gosneal (supra);
Mcargo v. Jergens, 206 N. Y. 363, 99 N. E. S38; Chappell v. Jasper
County Oil and Gas Co., 66 N. E. 515, 31 Ind. App. 170; and the principal
case.
The rule as stated lines up perfectly with the general doctrine that
pleadings withdrawn, and the rulings' thereon, form no part of the
R. L.
record. Chappell v. Jasper County Oil & Gas Co. (supra).

W iS-DEFEAsmri FEES.-The deceased devised certain land to his
widow for life, "and at her death to go to my two sons, equally, or to
the survivor if either should die without issue."
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Held: By this will each of the two sons took a defeasible fee in
one-half of the land, which might be defeated by the death of either of
them, at any time, without issue surviving him, and in case one should
die the other would take the whole fee. If either had issue, such issue
would take decedent's share. Middleton v. Graves, 229 Ky. 640, 17 S.
W. (2nd) 741.
This rule is well established in Kentucky by a long line of decisions
in which the various courts use practically the same language as that
used by the court in the principal case. Harvey v. Bell, 118 Ky. 512, 81
S. W. 671; Hart v. Thompson, 42 Ky. 482; Deboe v. Lowden, 8 B. Mon.
616; Daniel v. Thompson, 53 Ky. 662. In the latter case it was held
that where one of the sons conveyed the land devised to him and then
died without issue, the other children could recover. The same rule
applies although the devisee has reached his majority. Harrisv. Berry,
70 Ky. 13. But it is held that where the period of distribution is post
poned until after the devisees reach majority, the devise does not create
a defeasible fee, but such devisees as survive the devisor and become of
age take an absolute fee in the lnd, though they afterward die without
issue.
We have been unable to locate any cases in conflict with the principal case, and feel safe in saying that it represents the rule throughout
the United States. Bashe7l v. Rashe.AZ, 118 So. (Ala.) 553; In Re Clifton's Estate, 218 N. W. (Iowa) 926; Duval v. Duval, 291 S. W. (Mo.)
488; Larew v. Larew, 146 Va. 134, 135 S. E. 819.
While it is true that the law looks with disfavor upon defeasible
fees, it seems that in this type of case the law will support such a fee
H. D. D.
when that was clearly the intention of the testator.

WxLns-DvisE TO PERSON AND CHILDREN VESTS LImE ESTATE IN Suorr
PERSON, WITH REnmAi
To CHILDREN, UNtSS WILL SHows CONTRARY
Punpos.-Subject to the payment of the testator's debts, the estate was
devised to the widow and children till the youngest should reach his
majority. Held, the widow took a life estate, remainder to children.
E. H. Shelman & Co. v. Liver's Ex'x, 229 Ky. 90, 16 S. W. (2nd) 800.
The adjudicated cases in Kentucky show three distinct classes of
cases bearing on the subject of gifts by the testator to another and children. The real issue in each case is the interpretation of the word "children," whether the same is used as a word of limitation, showing the
nature of the estate given to the first taker, or as a word of purchase.
showing that a beneficial interest is devised to the children. Page on
Wills, Vol. 2, page 1617. The interpretation intended by the testator
must be evidenced by the will as a whole. Williams v. Duncan, 92 Ky.
127, 17 S. W. 442. The first class of cases is to the effect that the
parent takes a joint estate in fee simple with children then born or
thereafter to be born. Powell v. Powell, 5 Bush 620, 96 Am. Dec. 372;
Turner v. Patterson, 5 Dana 295; Cessna v. Cessn's Admr., 4 Bush
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516; Bell v. Kinneer, 101 Ky. 271, 40 S. W. 686, 72 Am. St. Rep. 410.
Unless it is expressly shown by the will that such was the intent of the
testator the court will not adhere to this class of cases since to do so
would likely result in a stranger to the blood of the testator acquiring
some portion of the estate. Houchins v. Houchins, 158 Ky. 190, 164
S. W. 791.
The second class of cases is where the word "children" is used in
the sense of heirs. Such a construction is adopted only where the will
as an entirety would seem to indicate that the testator intended the
words as words of limitation and not of purchase. Childers v. Logan,
23 Ky. Law Rep. 1239; Moran v. Dilehay, 8 Bush 434; Hood v. Dawson,
98 Ky. 285, 33 S. W. 75; Williams v. Duncan, 92 Ky. 125, 17 S. W. 330;
Lachland'sHeirs v. Downings' Exrs., 11 B. Mon. 32.
The third class of cases adheres to the doctrine as laid down in the
instant case, that is, that the parent takes a life estate, with remainder
to children, in the absence of a contrary intention being shown. This
class of cases represent the overwhelming weight of authority. Weaver
v. Weaver's Ex'rs., 92 Ky. 491, 185 S. W. 228, 36 Am. St. Rep. 604; Rice
v. lette, 149 Ky. 787, 149 S. W. 1019, L. R. A. 1917B 45; Fletcher v.
Tyler, 92 Ky. 145, 17 S. W. 282, 36 Am. St. Rep. 584; Hall v. Wright,
121 Ky. 16, 87 S. W. 1120; Brumley v. Brumley, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 231, 89
S. W. 182; Davis v Hardin,80 Ky. 672; McFarlandv. Hatchett, 118 Ky.
423, 80 S. W. 1185.
The Federal courts are in accord -with the rule adhered to in the
principal case. John I Estate v. Brown, 35 S. Ct. 106, 235 U. S. 342,
59 L; Ed. 259. A majority of the state courts also agree. Gist v. Pettus, 115 Ark. 400, 171 S. W. 480; Zuttle d Weaver Land Im irovement
Co. v. Barker, 178 Ala. 366, 60 So. 157; Davenport v. Collins, 96 Miss.
716, 51 So. 449; Brokaw v. Emens, 84 N. J. Eg. 652, 95 A. 117; Shields
v. Aitken, 236 Pa. 6, 84 Atl. 662; Guy v. Osborne, 91 S. 0. 291, 74 S. E.
617.
It is submitted that the rule of the present case is the one most
likely to carry out the intent of the testator in a majority of the cases.
E. E. A.

